tiskIMUN 2018

Research Report

DISEC

Personal Introduction: Chair

Hello everyone!
I'm Bioantika from Indonesia, I'll be your chair in DISEC TISKLMUN this year. MUN is something that I've known since Senior High School, MUN for me is not only a platform for discussing and knowing certain international issue, but it's more like a plateform to be an active change-maker, drafting a resolution, being aware of another country issue under the diplomatic table.

Together with Andrew, we've arranged the research report or study guide to make all the delegates are easier in understanding the issue in our council. If you have any question to ask, I humbly welcome everyone to approach me personally through manurungbioantika@gmail.com
Hopefully everyone could get a 5 star experience in TISKLMUN! See you in DISEC!

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Personal Introduction: Co-Chair

Hi, delegates, I'm Andrew Tsai, but you can just call me Andrew, I am currently a second year A Levels student at Taylor’s International School KL, I will be serving as your co-chair along with Bioantika, our chair. I have been MUN-ing for 3 years now and this will be my first time co-chairing a conference, just like my first time delegating, right at my own institution. Don’t forget to do your research! Don’t hesitate to contact me or the chair if you have any inquires, we will be there to assist you.



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Introduction to the Committee

The Disarmament and International Security Committee, also known as the First Committee is tasked with “disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.” DISEC was created as a direct manifestation of the UN’s overall purpose – to ensure that the escalation of arms that preceded World War II would be better controlled, if not extremely limited.

DISEC is the first body of its kind to encourage nations to cooperate on mutual security with this goal in mind, it failed to adequately develop a platform to have all nations voice their recommendations to improve global security. Thus, in a very real way, DISEC has become the forum for the world to advance ideas and visions that will ultimately achieve world peace.

The committee was first created in 1945 when the UN chapter was formally adopted, bringing the UN into existence. The first body, as stated before, was meant to serve as a forum to preserve international peace and security following the largest international conflict in history. The committee, however does not given the power to condemn actions, impose sanctions or authorize intervention into another state – these powers were reserved for the United Nations Security Council. Thus, the committee was designed from the start to ensure that every UN member state’s views on international security were heard and formally addressed, with the potential that these views would be put into action by the United Nations Security Council.

Introduction to the Committee

One of the most important roles for DISEC has been to recommend peacekeeping mission to the UNSC. The format is designed to ensure that the needs and opinions of the international community are addressed while allowing for the smaller UNSC to quickly implement the mission. DISEC's recommendation to intervene the Middle East in 1948 is among the most important decisions made by the body, ultimately giving the Security Council a stronger international consensus to act. In fact, many of the peacekeeping missions authorized by the UNSC have first been recommended by DISEC.



Topic A:

Nuclear Proliferation of P5 countries

Introduction to the Topic

Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons technology or fissile material to countries that do not already possess them. The term is also used to refer to the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations or other armed groups.

Research into the development of nuclear weapons was undertaken during World War II by the United States (in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada), Germany, Japan, and the USSR. The United States was the first and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August 1945. With their loss during the war, Germany and Japan ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research. In August 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear weapon. The United Kingdom tested a nuclear weapon in October 1952. France developed a nuclear weapon in 1960. The People's Republic of China detonated a nuclear weapon in 1964. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear weapon tests in May 1998, following tests by India earlier that month. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test.

Some international relations theorists have rejected the idea that nuclear proliferation necessarily increases the likelihood of nuclear conflict. According to the American scholar Kenneth Waltz, for example, the spread of nuclear weapons can actually generate stability and peace, because nuclear powers will be deterred from attacking each other by the threat of nuclear retaliation. Other scholars, however, have argued that nuclear proliferation inevitably increases the risk of a catastrophic nuclear explosion, whether deliberate or accidental.

Nuclear Proliferation In P5 Countries

Russia

After the Korean War, the Soviet Union transferred nuclear technology and weapons to the People's Republic of China as an adversary of the United States and NATO. According to Ion Mihai Pacepa, "Khrushchev's nuclear-proliferation process started with Communist China in April 1955, when the new ruler in the Kremlin consented to supply Beijing a sample atomic bomb and to help with its mass production. Subsequently, the Soviet Union built all the essentials of China's new military nuclear industry."

Russia is one of the five "Nuclear Weapons States" (NWS) under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which Russia ratified (as the Soviet Union) in 1968. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a number of Soviet-era nuclear warheads remained on the territories of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Under the terms of the Lisbon Protocol to the NPT, and following the 1995 Trilateral Agreement between Russia, Belarus, and the USA, these were transferred to Russia, leaving Russia as the sole inheritor of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. It is estimated that the Soviet Union had approximately 45,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled at the time of its collapse.

The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for a warming of relations with NATO. Fears of a nuclear holocaust lessened. In September 1997, the former secretary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed claimed 100 "suitcase sized" nuclear weapons were unaccounted for. He said he was attempting to inventory the weapons when he was fired by President Boris Yeltsin in October 1996. Indeed, several US politicians have expressed worries and promised legislation addressing the threat.

Nuclear Proliferation In P5 Countries

In 2002, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce their stockpiles to not more than 2,700 warheads each in the SORT treaty. In 2003, the US rejected Russian proposals to further reduce each nation's nuclear stockpiles to 1,500. Russia, in turn, refused to discuss reduction of tactical nuclear weapons.

There were allegations that Russia contributed to North Korean nuclear program, selling it the equipment for the safe storage and transportation of nuclear materials. Nevertheless, Russia condemned North Korean nuclear tests since then.

Security of nuclear weapons in Russia remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian SVR defector Tretyakov, he had a meeting with two Russian businessman representing a state-created C-W corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of Novaya Zemlya (a test place for Soviet nuclear weapons) using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his dacha outside Moscow. Tretyakov thought that man was insane, but the "businessmen" (Vladimir K. Dmitriev) replied: "Do not be so naive. With economic conditions the way they are in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a nuclear bomb. It's no big deal really".

Nuclear Proliferation In P5 Countries

United States

Early on in the development of its nuclear weapons, the United States relied in part on information-sharing with both the United Kingdom and Canada, as codified in the Quebec Agreement of 1943. These three parties agreed not to share nuclear weapons information with other countries without the consent of the others, an early attempt at nonproliferation. After the development of the first nuclear weapons during World War II, though, there was much debate within the political circles and public sphere of the United States about whether or not the country should attempt to maintain a monopoly on nuclear technology, or whether it should undertake a program of information sharing with other nations (especially its former ally and likely competitor, the Soviet Union), or submit control of its weapons to some sort of international organization (such as the United Nations) who would use them to attempt to maintain world peace. Though fear of a nuclear arms race spurred many politicians and scientists to advocate some degree of international control or sharing of nuclear weapons and information, many politicians and members of the military believed that it was better in the short term to maintain high standards of nuclear secrecy and to forestall a Soviet bomb as long as possible (and they did not believe the USSR would actually submit to international controls in good faith).

Nuclear Proliferation In P5 Countries

Since this path was chosen, the United States was, in its early days, essentially an advocate for the prevention of nuclear proliferation, though primarily for the reason of self-preservation. A few years after the USSR detonated its first weapon in 1949, though, the U.S. under President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to encourage a program of sharing nuclear information related to civilian nuclear power and nuclear physics in general. The Atoms for Peace program, begun in 1953, was also in part political: the U.S. was better poised to commit various scarce resources, such as enriched uranium, towards this peaceful effort, and to request a similar contribution from the Soviet Union, who had far fewer resources along these lines; thus the program had a strategic justification as well, as was later revealed by internal memos. This overall goal of promoting civilian use of nuclear energy in other countries, while also preventing weapons dissemination, has been labeled by many critics as contradictory and having led to lax standards for a number of decades which allowed a number of other nations, such as China and India, to profit from dual-use technology (purchased from nations other than the U.S.).

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency was established after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 to aid former Soviet bloc countries in the inventory and destruction of their sites for developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and their methods of delivering them (ICBM silos, long-range bombers, etc.). Over $4.4 billion has been spent on this endeavor to prevent purposeful or accidental proliferation of weapons from the former Soviet arsenal.

Nuclear Proliferation In P5 Countries

After India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions on the countries. In 1999, however, the sanctions against India were lifted; those against Pakistan were kept in place as a result of the military government that had taken over. Shortly after the September 11 attacks in 2001, President George W. Bush lifted the sanctions against Pakistan as well, in order to get the Pakistani government's help as a conduit for US and NATO forces for operations in Afghanistan.

The U.S. government has officially taken a silent policy towards the nuclear weapons ambitions of the state of Israel, while being exceedingly vocal against proliferation of such weapons in the countries of Iran and North Korea. Until 2005 when the program was cancelled, it was violating its own non-proliferation treaties in the pursuit of so-called nuclear bunker busters. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. was done, in part, on indications that Weapons of Mass Destruction were being stockpiled (lately, stockpiles of previously undeclared nerve agent and mustard gas shells have been located in Iraq), and the Bush administration said that its policies on proliferation were responsible for the Libyan government's agreement to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

China

China acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) in 1992 and is the only NWS that has ratified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. The Chinese nuclear program started in the mid-1950s. In 1964, China conducted its first nuclear weapon test. China possesses some 240 nuclear warheads.

Nuclear Proliferation In P5 Countries

Although China has sponsored many disarmament resolutions in the United Nations, it is proceeding with modernizing its nuclear arsenal, in addition to increasing its military capabilities. Despite promises to do so, China has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and continues to maintain its nuclear test site. Many analysts attribute China's nuclear modernization efforts to the US development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses, which undermine China's minimum deterrence capacity.

China's role as a proliferator to countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and 1990s prompted the United States to exert pressure on the country to adhere to international nonproliferation treaties, and especially export controls regime. Even though China is still not member to regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), it managed to close the major gaps in its domestic export controls regulations by 2002.

Acting as a mediator between the United States and North Korea, China has been one of the main players in the Six-Party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
A new version of the 123 agreement under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is currently being drafted. It would give China leeway to buy US nuclear energy technology. Negotiations over the agreement have persuaded China to agree to controls on technology and materials that are tighter than those currently in the accord.

Weapons experts also currently note that China already has enough surplus highly-enriched uranium and plutonium to make hundreds of new bombs.
On April 24, 2014, the Republic of the Marshall Islands filed a lawsuit against China at the International Court of Justice for violation of customary international law regarding the obligation to negotiate for an end to the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament. The case is expected to last into at least 2016.

Nuclear Proliferation In P5 Countries

France

As permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and as a nuclear-weapon state as defined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), France has a special responsibility for maintaining and strengthening international peace and security.

France position rely in an action on non-proliferation, it reflects twofold responsibility, and are guided by certain unchanging principles:
- Working towards a safer world,
- Developing friendly relations between states
- Forestalling threats to peace.
- Respecting the right of legitimate self-defence,
- Opting out of the arms race,
- Moving towards general and complete disarmament.

France pursues its aim by means of multilateral approaches, normative regime and where necessary, informal initiatives.

Future of the P5 Process on Nuclear Weapons

In 2007 the five recognized nuclear-weapon states convened for the first time to examine what nuclear transparency and confidence-building measures they could jointly pursue. The P5 process, it came to be known, was born in a nuclear policy environment vastly different from the one that prevails today.

It was established as a result of an initiative from the United Kingdom, which was eager to reverse the stagnation it sensed in the nuclear-weapon states' progress toward meeting their disarmament commitments under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In June 2007, UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett argued for the need to "engage with other members of the P5 on transparency and confidence-building measures," as well as to involve them in the testing of future verification regimes.

The French submarine Le Terrible is seen during its inauguration in Cherbourg on March 21, 2008. In his speech at the ceremony, French President Nicolas Sarkozy highlighted France's efforts to increase transparency with regard to its nuclear weapons program and dismantle its facilities for producing nuclear weapons material.

This initiative aligned with renewed interest in arms control and nuclear transparency measures in other nuclear-weapon states. French President Nicolas Sarkozy used his 2008 speech at Cherbourg to reveal new transparency measures for the French nuclear force. Shortly after entering office in 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama set out his commitment to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons. He promised to reach an agreement with Russia on a further round of strategic arms reductions by the end of 2009 and argued that this would "set the stage for further cuts" and that the United States would seek to include all the nuclear-weapon states in this effort.

Topic A

To combat the widening global wealth gap

Future of the P5 Process on Nuclear Weapons

The P5 process was launched at approximately the same time, and its first high-level conference took place in London in September 2009. Its value in the broader strategic context was clear, that a forum for multilateral confidence-building measures among the nuclear-weapon states in relation to their nuclear forces could support other bilateral and multilateral nuclear initiatives, in which there was fresh interest. Proponents of the process hoped that nuclear-weapon-state cooperation could gradually generate sustainable momentum toward further disarmament.

These encouraging developments breathed new life into the 2010 NPT Review Conference, at which the participating countries unanimously agreed on a 64-point action plan covering all three of the treaty's pillars—disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Of particular relevance to this discussion, the action plan called on the nuclear-weapon states to act together to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons and to enhance transparency and mutual confidence. With this validation, the P5 process accelerated its efforts to undertake collaborative projects in time for the 2015 review conference.

The P5 process is now nearing that milestone. Over the course of its life, it has taken small but potentially important collective steps. The modesty of these steps, however, has made a number of non-nuclear-weapon states concerned that earlier promises, namely, that the P5 process would someday help facilitate new disarmament measures, may never come to pass. Instead of gradual progress, those states see only opacity and potentially insurmountable stagnation.

Topic A

To combat the widening global wealth gap

Future of the P5 Process on Nuclear Weapons

This impression is reinforced by the changes in relations among the nuclear-weapon states that have taken place over the past five years. These changes, such as those arising from the recent conflict over the future of Ukraine, have occurred outside of NPT meeting rooms. Antagonism of the type generated by the crisis in Ukraine is something the P5 process never had the power to counter. At the moment, the process is in a difficult position, caught between strategic realities and NPT pressures.

It might still be possible for the P5 process to continue to undertake new initiatives, even if they are small and lack buy-in from all five members of the group. By doing so, the process could help lay the groundwork for more-ambitious disarmament endeavors that might become palatable if security relations among the nuclear-weapon states begin to improve. At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, these states should demonstrate the P5 process' continued relevance by setting out a work plan detailing the initiatives they will pursue in the next NPT review cycle. Even this objective might be a challenge, given the reluctance of some nuclear-weapon states to support forward movement. Yet, without such a plan, doubts about the purpose of the process are likely to grow further, expanding the pressures that the five countries are likely to face from non-nuclear-weapon states in the NPT environment.

Topic A

To combat the widening global wealth gap



Questions To Answer

- What is the importance of nuclear proliferation? Does nuclear proliferation is needed in current world?
- What is the role of P5 nations in nuclear proliferation?
- What is the outcome of having and not-having nuclear proliferation
- What is the alternative solution in maintaining the security of the world outside of having nuclear to be proliferated in most of nations?
- How are the engagements between non-nuclear country and nuclear country in perceiving a global security issue?

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Topic B:

Discussing the militarisation of space

Introduction to the Topic

The “Militarization of Space”, is defined as the placement and development of military technology in Outer Space. The first ever weapon that has been in space was the V-2 Rocket developed by Germany during the Second World War. The exploration of space in the early 20th century was partly motivated by its military advantages. The US and the USSR, benefited from these space programme by testing their ballistic missile capabilities, and developing suitable weapons for military use. Currently, there 70 space agencies in the world, only 13 have launch capabilities.

Timeline of Events

1959 - The establishment of the UN-COPUOS
The mission of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is to review the scope of international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, to devise programmes in this field to be undertaken under United Nations auspices, to encourage continued research and the dissemination of information on outer space matters, and to study legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space.

1960s - The deployment of military satellites
The US and the USSR deployed reconnaissance satellites to partake the monitoring of both sides' military installations.

1967 - Outer Space Treaty

1972 - Space Liability Convention
It states that states shall bear the international responsibility for all space objects that are launched within their territory.

1974 - Registration Convention
It requires member nations to furnish the UN with details of objects that are orbiting the Earth. The UN General Assembly as already adopted resolution to maintain a registry of launches into space.

1979 - Moon Treaty
It includes but not limited to: the banning of any kinds of military usage of celestial bodies or the ownership of any extraterrestrial bodies by any non-governmental or international organizations or the alteration of the environment of any celestial bodies.

1980s - The launch of Global Positioning System in space
By the US Department of Defense

Outer Space Treaty

It prohibits member states party to the treaty from placing weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit, installing them on any celestial bodies, or stationing them in outer space. It limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and prohibits their use for testing weapons of any kind. However, the Treaty does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in orbit and thus some highly destructive attack strategies such as kinetic bombardment are still potentially allowable.

So far only 107 countries have ratified the treaty including the P5 nations, India and DPRK. Delegates should seek to expand the terms of the treaty and to look into follow up treaties, to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons in space while maintaining their national interests.

Past & Recent Developments

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Key Issues

Militarization of outer space: space has been militarized since the earliest communication satellites were launched. Today, militaries all over the world rely on satellites for command and control, communication, monitoring, early warning, and navigation with the Global Positioning System. Therefore, “peaceful uses” of outer space include military uses, even those which are not at all peaceful—such as using satellites to direct bombing raids or to orchestrate a “prompt global strike” capability, which is “the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.”

The major players are China, Russia, and the USA. With other countries soon following, this will lead to a proliferation of the creation space weapons and the heavy militarization of space, breaching several past international agreements, and increase tensions between countries. A more comprehensive and inclusive agreement is needed to curb the militarization of space.

Weaponization of outer space: space weaponization is generally understood to refer to the placement in orbit of space-based devices that have a destructive capacity. Many experts argue that ground-based systems designed or used to attack space-based assets also constitute as space weapons, though are not technically part of the “weaponization of outer space” since they are not placed in orbit. Some also argue that weapons that travel through space in order to reach their targets, such as hypersonic technology vehicles, also contribute to the weaponization of space.

Key Issues

The overwhelming majority of UN member states are concerned that the weaponization of outer space will lead to an arms race and insist that a multilateral treaty is the only way to prevent such an arms race, emphasizing that this treaty would not limit space access, but would prevent such limitations. In 2006, Russia argued that if all states observe a prohibition on space weaponization, there will be no arms race. Russia and China also support establishing an obligation of no use or threat of use of force against space objects and have submitted a draft treaty to the UN on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.

Links for Further Research

UN Debates
https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gaspd322.doc.htm
https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gaspd323.doc.htm
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